The failures of the Shin Bet and the police in East Jerusalem

The terrorist attacks carried out by the terrorist Udai al-Tamimi from the Shoafat refugee camp until he was killed by the security guards of the settlement of Maale Adumim reveal a great deal of the failures of the Shin Bet and the police in East Jerusalem. The time has come for a comprehensive lesson-learning process in the Shin Bet and the police in everything related to the security situation in East Jerusalem

Sources in East Jerusalem claim that the 16-year-old terrorist Muhammad Abu Katish, who carried out the stabbing attack in the French Hill neighborhood in Jerusalem and seriously wounded an Israeli youth, carried out the attack to avenge the death of the terrorist Udai al-Tamimi, who was killed in a shootout while trying to carry out a shooting attack at the entrance to the settlement of Maale Adumim Last week.
Udai al-Tamimi became the local hero for the Palestinians after he carried out the murderous attack at the Shuafat checkpoint and killed a female IDF soldier.


The killing of the terrorist Udai al-Tamimi has covered only slightly the failure of the Shin Bet, the police and the IDF who were unable to locate the terrorist for 10 days, it turns out that he managed to get out of the Shoafat refugee camp, the Hamas organization claims that the terrorist belongs to its ranks and on social networks it glorifies and praises the terrorist.


The killing of the terrorist is an important step in suppressing the efforts of the terrorist organizations to create a new armed intifada in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Udai al-Tamimi restored national pride to East Jerusalem and cast a shadow over the activities of the “Lions Den” group from Nablus.


The East Jerusalem street embraced him and hundreds of young people began to shave their heads in solidarity with the bald terrorist and to make the search for him more difficult.

The failure of the Shin Bet

The terrorist Udai al-Tamimi had no security record, according to the testimonies of residents of the Shoafat refugee camp where he lived, he purchased the gun with which he carried out the attack with his own money and carried out surveillance operations after the routine at the Shoafat checkpoint and at the entrance to the Maale Adumim settlement. A video was circulated on social media in which he was seen practicing shooting with gun in a shooting range.


After carrying out the attack at the Shuafat checkpoint, he fled to the refugee camp and hid there for ten days with the help of his friends and family members.


Despite the intensive search operation by the security forces, they were unable to arrest him.


As soon as the blockade over the Shoafat refugee camp was lifted, he again launched another attack at the entrance to the settlement of Maale Adumim.


The Shin Bet’s intelligence failure is very clear in the mere fact that it did not have an intelligence infrastructure within the Shoafat refugee camp that would warn in advance of the attacks planned by Udai al-Tamimi and also assist in his capture when he hid for 10 consecutive days inside the camp while receiving assistance with clothes and food from his associates without the Shin Bet being able to track him down.


This failure requires the Shin Bet to draw immediate lessons and deploy a better infrastructure of intelligence in all the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, not only in the Shoafat refugee camp in order to better prepare for the future, since it is not clear how long the wave of terror will last which may also may turn into a new intifada.


The Jerusalem police also It is not without its failures, the decision to impose a prolonged closure on the Shoafat refugee camp in East Jerusalem, where about 140 thousand residents live, was a big mistake, it harmed the fabric of life of tens of thousands of families whose members work inside Jerusalem and increased the residents’ hatred of Israel and their desire to take revenge for imposing collective punishment after the attack committed by Udai al-Tamimi.


It turns out that the police are continuing with previous mistakes they made in East Jerusalem, such as placing roadblocks in the Nablus Gate Square during the month of Ramadan and placing magnetometers at the gates of the Temple Mount, these actions indicate a lack of understanding of the reality in East Jerusalem, steps that caused unnecessary unrest among the Arab population and increased the hatred and violence.


The time has come for the Shin Bet and the police to do a comprehensive process of learning lessons on how to deal with terrorism and violence in East Jerusalem with minimal security damage.

Yoni Ben Menachem Senior Middle East Analyst

About Yoni Ben Menachem

Yoni Ben Menachem is a Middle East senior analyst ,a journalist and
the former CEO of the Israel Broadcasting Authority(IBA). He has
decades of experience in written and video journalism. Ben
Menachem’s path in the media world began as a producer for
Japanese television in the Middle East. After that, he held many key
positions in the media The Israeli: CEO of the Israel Broadcasting
Authority, director of “Kol Israel” Radio, reporter on West Bank and
Gaza Strip affairs, political reporter and commentator, commentator
on Middle East affairs and editor-in-chief and presenter of the
program “Middle East Magazine”. 

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