Last week, discussions in Israel explored the option of deporting the Hamas military elite from Gaza to end hostilities, secure the release of abductees, disarm the military wing of Hamas, and prevent further casualties.
While this idea is considered unlikely, it’s crucial for Israel to be prepared for all scenarios.
Theoretical discussions involve deporting Sinwar, his brother Muhammad, and other key figures to countries like Qatar, Turkey, or Lebanon.
However, there is no official proposal on the agenda.
In contrast, Hamas is intensifying its stance, vowing to defeat IDF forces and imposing challenging conditions on Israel for the release of abductees.
While some security officials suggest that certain countries might accept the deported leaders, such as Qatar, Turkey, or Lebanon, the proposal faces resistance.
Reports from France indicate discussions on a plan suggesting the deportation of Hamas leaders to Algeria, coupled with the deployment of an Arab security force in Gaza.
However, Algeria’s support for Hamas and previous reconciliation attempts with the PA suggest a complicated diplomatic landscape.
Hamas vehemently rejects the possibility of deportation, considering it part of psychological warfare.
They assert their commitment to staying in Gaza and leading the conflict against IDF forces.
Any discussion of this proposal is deemed unnecessary, representing a potential reward for terrorism.
Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Galant have consistently presented two options for the Hamas military leadership: surrender or face the consequences.
Offering a third option without consequences could be seen as a sign of weakness.
The international community should be made aware that Israel’s position remains unchanged, with surrender or death being the only choices for the Hamas leadership.
Yahya Sinwar is unlikely to agree to deportation, viewing it as surrender and humiliation for Hamas.
The worst-case scenario might involve attempting to escape to Egypt through the network of tunnels under the “Philadelphia Corridor” with Israeli abductees.
The historical precedent of Yasser Arafat’s deportation in 1982 from Lebanon to Tunisia serves as a cautionary tale.
Arafat’s return in 1993, under the Oslo Accords, led to the armed intifada in 2000.
To avoid a similar mistake, the focus should be on the physical elimination of the Hamas military elite, who bear responsibility for the deaths of Israelis and Palestinians.
Arrest or trial may not suffice; their actions demand the ultimate accountability – death.
