Senior security officials confirm that conflicts have erupted at the top of Iran’s political hierarchy between President Masoud Pezhkian and the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Ahmad Vahedi, signaling a deepening of military oversight over the state and the gradual transformation of governance into a military dictatorship.
President Pezhkian, who seeks to pursue a moderate line toward the West and prevent economic collapse, is being challenged by the new IRGC commander, who has effectively excluded him from negotiations and maintains control over the core instruments of power.
The rift between political and military leadership indicates that security forces, particularly the IRGC, have become the central mechanism dictating state policy. The arrest of associates of President Pezhkian and the cessation of support for civilian institutions reflect a prioritization of military power over the civilian system.
According to security sources, the domestic situation, where the military and security apparatus replace the government as the main decision-making body, represents an advanced stage of repression and total military control through the Basij forces, undermining public trust and the state’s ability to manage economic and security crises.
The Decline of the Clerical Establishment
Prior to the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei by Israel at the outset of the current war, Iran’s political structure was based on a combination of religious legitimacy and security-military authority. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 until recent years, governance was aligned with the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, the rule of the supreme jurist, in which the Supreme Leader and Shiite clerics were the central decision-makers.
Meanwhile, the IRGC gradually accumulated power, but remained formally subordinate to the religious institutions, operating primarily in military and security roles without full control over the political and economic systems.
Political resilience relied on limited public support, religious institutions, and internal oversight mechanisms, with the military not serving as the dominant force in setting the state’s agenda.
Domestic and foreign policies balanced religious and regional interests, with religious legitimacy providing continuity and stability, while the IRGC, though influential, did not lead the power structure.
This framework allowed for a degree of balance between religious and military authority, ensuring that central decisions incorporated religious, public, and security considerations.
The Rule of Mojtaba Khamenei: A Puppet of the IRGC
The newly appointed Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, officially continues the framework of Velayat-e Faqih, but according to senior security officials, his rule is largely artificial. Mojtaba Khamenei owes his position to the IRGC, which threatened members of the Assembly of Experts responsible for selecting the Supreme Leader, ensuring that he would be chosen. He has effectively become a puppet through which the IRGC intends to control Iran.
Senior officials describe this as a historic turning point, in which power is gradually shifting from the Shiite clerics to the security-military institution of the IRGC, which now dictates the central decisions of the state.
Internal political resilience now depends less on religious legitimacy or public support and more on the control, oversight, and internal security provided by the IRGC, which has become the key actor in managing the economy, politics, and foreign policy while maintaining stability and safeguarding the ruling system.
This transition has been further reinforced by the appointment of senior officials with extensive IRGC backgrounds to central government and state positions, including Parliament Speaker Mahmoud Baqer Qalibaf, now a dominant figure in the civilian apparatus and the interlocutor for President Trump in indirect negotiations to end the war, and Mohammad Baqer Do Alqader, who replaced Ali Larijani as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, reflecting the prioritization of military-security power over the religious system.
Religion now serves largely as a symbolic framework, while military power advances and dictates governance.
This model enhances the security apparatus’s immediate control but creates potential long-term vulnerabilities, as the narrowing of public debate and legitimacy may lead to inflexibility and more extreme decision-making during crises.
Iran continues to present itself as an “Islamic Republic,” but the essence of governance is shifting toward a security-military power center, signaling a new era in the country’s power structure.
Regarding the Shiite clerical establishment, based on three main councils, the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council, and the Expediency Discernment Council, security sources assess that the IRGC will gradually neutralize their influence, though not entirely in the short term.
The councils will remain as symbolic institutions providing external legitimacy, while the IRGC is expected to sideline President Masoud Pezhkian, who also owes his election in July 2024 to their support.
It appears that real power in decision-making and central policy will continue to reside with the IRGC, representing the security-military establishment, while the religious establishment becomes primarily a tool for legitimacy rather than an independent decision-making authority.
