From the outset of the conflict, it has been evident that Iran seeks to avoid a full-scale confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel.
Instead, Tehran’s strategy involves drawing Israel into a prolonged war of attrition through its proxies across the Middle East, weakening Israel economically and militarily over time.
In this way, Iran minimizes its direct involvement, keeping itself at a distance while fighting Israel via its allies.
Tehran engages Israel until the last Palestinian fighter or Shiite proxy has been spent, with Iran’s leadership—the “head of the octopus”—remaining intact even if some of its arms are lost.
Iranian President Masoud Pazashekian, speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on September 22, made clear that “Iran will not fall into the trap of war.” He emphasized, “We know more than anyone that if a large-scale war erupts in the Middle East, it will be to no one’s benefit.”
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arkaji echoed these sentiments, declaring that Iran is in a state of “full vigilance” and will not be lured into conflict by Israel.
He pointed to the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil as an attempt “to provoke us into a larger conflict.”
The memory of the Iran-Iraq war looms large in the Iranian psyche. Lasting from 1980 to 1988, this grueling conflict claimed between 500,000 and one million lives, the majority of them Iranian.
Iran, at that time, fought a war of attrition with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which sought to annex the oil-rich Khuzestan province.
In the end, no territorial changes occurred, and Iran paid a heavy price, teaching it to be cautious about future wars.
Now, Iran fears Israel’s intentions to drag Hezbollah into an all-out military confrontation, aiming to gain international support to destroy Hezbollah’s extensive arsenal, supplied by Iran over many years.
Iran also worries that Israel may then shift focus to its nuclear facilities and oil infrastructure, crippling the Iranian economy in the process.
Iran believes that if Donald Trump wins the next U.S. presidential election, he will likely back Israel’s plan.
To counter this, Tehran is doing everything in its power not to damage Kamala Harris’ chances of being elected president.
A war with Israel could severely damage Iran’s already fragile economy. President Pazashekian has made economic improvement a priority of his administration.
Following Israel’s recent attack on the Yemeni port of Hodeidah, Iran now recognizes that its oil infrastructure is vulnerable to Israeli airstrikes, which could cause significant damage.
Thus, Tehran’s message to Nasrallah is to stay the course—continue the war of attrition against Israel, even if it means absorbing Israeli attacks.
In the end, Nasrallah relies on Iranian military support, even if Israel manages to significantly reduce Hezbollah’s missile and rocket capabilities.
Since the end of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Iran has heavily invested in Hezbollah’s military strength, positioning it as a “front line” defense against potential Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites.
Although Nasrallah may hold independent views and is known to disagree with Tehran on occasion, he ultimately must align with Iran’s strategic interests.
Sources in Lebanon report that General Ismail Qa’ani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, visited Nasrallah’s bunker in the A-Dahiyah neighborhood of Beirut a few months ago.
During the visit, he relayed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s instructions, reinforcing that Nasrallah must not deviate from the strategy of attrition without explicit approval.
Iranian Revolutionary Guard commanders, orchestrating the war from Tehran, believe that Israel was never designed for prolonged warfare.
Since its founding, Israel has relied on short, decisive conflicts, aiming to shift battles onto enemy territory and secure swift victories.
Now, after dealing with multiple fronts for more than a year, Iran believes that Israel is weakening—economically, militarily, and morally. Its global political standing is, according to Tehran, in a state of decline.
