Senior political sources say that the current war, which has not yet ended, has reinforced the conclusion that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps holds the final word in both domestic and foreign affairs in Iran.
According to these sources, the Revolutionary Guards have become the dominant force in the country, wielding decisive power and steadily expanding their influence.
What began as a military organization has evolved into the central actor shaping Iranian politics, to the point of pushing the traditional political establishment to the margins.
Negotiations between the United States and Iran are expected to resume this week in Islamabad. President Trump hopes to conclude them with an agreement before his visit to China on the 14th of the month and his meeting with President Xi Jinping.
Vice President J.D. Vance is expected to head the American negotiating delegation.
However, senior Israeli officials express deep skepticism, given the significant gaps separating the positions of the two sides.
The desire to secure an agreement before Trump’s trip to China sends a message to the Iranians that the American president is under pressure to arrive in Beijing with an achievement in hand, a factor that weakens the American negotiating position, political sources say. In their view, President Trump must project determination and American self-confidence.
This is compounded by reports from administration officials suggesting that Trump is eager to end the war because of the upcoming World Cup and the midterm elections in November.
Washington believes that intensified military pressure, the American blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and tighter economic sanctions will force Iran to compromise at the negotiating table. In practice, however, Tehran is focused on its ability to absorb pressure and adapt to it. As a result, the two sides are operating according to entirely different standards of success, making it highly doubtful that they are moving toward genuine agreement.
Senior political officials argue that the central problem is the complete lack of trust between the parties.
Iran does not believe that the United States will honor long-term commitments regarding sanctions relief, especially after the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement.
Washington, meanwhile, doubts that Iran would respect any agreement related to its nuclear program or regional policies, given Tehran’s consistent reliance on deception and manipulation.
Without a fundamental change in the expectations of both sides, the creation of credible trust mechanisms, and the establishment of a genuine diplomatic path, the negotiations are likely to remain stalled, while escalation will merely be managed rather than resolved.
According to these political sources, the crisis between Iran and the United States is not merely a confrontation over the nuclear program, sanctions relief, or control of the Strait of Hormuz. It is a clash between two entirely different worldviews regarding what negotiations are, how they should be conducted, and what their ultimate purpose truly is.
On one side stands the United States, or more precisely President Trump, conducting the talks with the mindset of a fast-moving dealmaker seeking quick, clear, and measurable results.
On the other side stands Iran, managing the confrontation through a long-term, gradual, and methodical approach, in which every round of talks represents merely another phase in a broader struggle over power and influence.
At the core of the crisis lies one central issue: the absence of trust.
For Iran, the United States is a party that has already violated agreements, shifted positions, withdrawn from the 2015 nuclear deal signed under President Obama, and combined military and economic pressure with diplomatic engagement. Therefore, every return to the negotiating table is perceived not only as an opportunity, but also as a risk.
This explains Iran’s insistence on preconditions and its refusal to negotiate over what it considers red lines, such as surrendering enriched uranium or agreeing to halt uranium enrichment entirely.
In Washington, by contrast, an entirely different logic prevails. Decision-making is heavily influenced by the rhythm of domestic politics, public opinion, congressional midterm elections, internal power struggles, regional pressures, and the need to preserve America’s standing vis-à-vis Russia and China.
As a result, negotiations oscillate between threats and compromise, between opening diplomatic channels and simultaneously hardening positions.
The outcome is an inconsistent diplomacy: on the one hand, declarations expressing a desire for an agreement, and on the other hand, pressure measures, sanctions, and military signaling. From Iran’s perspective, this reflects weakness rather than strategy.
Iran operates according to a completely different logic. For Tehran, time is a strategic instrument rather than an obstacle.
Every delay in negotiations, every temporary crisis, and every renewal of external pressure are viewed as part of a prolonged campaign designed to exhaust the adversary through a war of attrition rather than rush toward a settlement.
At the same time, the Iranian system demonstrates a relatively high degree of unity around its hardline position: no negotiations under coercion and no surrender of core strategic assets without significant compensation.
Security officials say that the gap between the two sides is not merely political, but rooted in fundamentally different perceptions of power and international relations.
In Washington, negotiations are a tool for achieving a rapid deal.
In Tehran, negotiations are an arena of continuous struggle.
In the United States, time is a limited resource.
In Iran, time is a strategic space for maneuver.
This gap creates a situation in which each side interprets the actions of the other as either mistakes or signs of weakness, rather than deliberate strategic choices.
Security sources assess that in the short term, given its military achievements, the United States holds a clear tactical advantage: economic leverage, regional military presence, and coordination with key allies.
In the medium and long term, however, the picture becomes more complicated.
Iran has developed a relatively high capacity to absorb sanctions and pressure, while also building a regional network of influence that enables it to apply indirect leverage.
In addition, its strategy of attrition is better suited to prolonged confrontations in which there is no rapid decisive outcome.
Consequently, a prevailing assessment among some Israeli security officials is that if the negotiations remain short-term and narrowly focused, the United States will maintain the upper hand and dictate the terms of an agreement.
But if the crisis drags on and evolves into a prolonged war of attrition, Iran is expected to gradually improve its position and potentially impose a new political reality.
The struggle between Tehran and Washington is not merely about a nuclear agreement or sanctions. It is a battle between two perceptions of time, two political cultures, and two different forms of power.
It is a confrontation between the American fast-deal negotiator and the Iranian master of strategic attrition. The real question is not simply who is right, but who is capable of enduring longer in a game where time itself has become the central weapon.
Ultimately, the decision on whether to move toward an agreement will rest with the Revolutionary Guards, who are highly skilled at the politics of perception and image. If they sense that President Trump is under intense pressure to secure a deal, the negotiations are likely to drag on, while Tehran attempts to activate its pressure machine in pursuit of further American concessions.
