A broad American initiative is currently underway in the Middle East, with the aim of disarming three armed resistance organizations that are designated as terrorist organizations by the United States and Israel and that operate against Israel and American interests. They are Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq, according to senior political officials.
According to these officials, the US-led effort, with Israeli assistance, is intended to undermine the radical Shiite axis led by Iran.
Senior security officials say that, on the surface, the three organizations appear similar. All maintain independent military capabilities; all operate outside the state’s full monopoly over the use of force; Hamas operates outside the framework of the Palestinian Authority; and all three have ties, to varying degrees, with Iran.
But this similarity is misleading. Each organization has a different history, emerged under different circumstances, maintains a different relationship with Tehran, and occupies a different position within the environment in which it operates.
According to the security officials, one particularly important distinction concerns the Gaza Strip. Gaza is not a sovereign state, and therefore Hamas cannot be compared in state terms with the militias in Iraq or with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Since 2007, Hamas has been the de facto governing authority in the Gaza Strip, but it has never been the government of a sovereign state. Consequently, its disarmament is linked not only to the question of who holds the monopoly over the use of force, but also to the question of who will govern Gaza after the war.
Lebanon and Iraq, by contrast, are established states with governing institutions, armies, and official security services. There, the central question is whether the state is capable of reclaiming its monopoly over the use of force from armed organizations.
The American mission, therefore, cannot be identical in all three arenas.
In the Gaza Strip, the issue is the dismantling of Hamas’s military power and the construction of an alternative governing and security framework. In Lebanon, it is an attempt to restore the state’s monopoly over the use of force in the face of Hezbollah. In Iraq, it involves either disarming armed militias or integrating them into the state, despite the fact that some maintain deep ties with Iran.
Hamas– From Resistance Movement to Ruling Authority
Hamas is the first case that must be examined. The organization was established in the Gaza Strip in 1987, at the outbreak of the First Intifada, emerging from the Muslim Brotherhood. In other words, it was not created as an Iranian proxy, but as a Palestinian Islamist movement opposed to Israel.
Over the years, Hamas evolved from a resistance organization into a military organization and a political force. After winning the 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, it seized control of the Gaza Strip by force in 2007 and effectively became the territory’s de facto governing authority.
Hamas’s weapons, therefore, are not merely instruments of its struggle against Israel. They have also been the foundation of its political power and its control over Gaza. This is why the demand that Hamas disarm is so sensitive. Dismantling its military wing would mean not merely weakening the organization, but fundamentally changing its status and the governing system it built over many years.
Hamas also has close ties with Iran, which has provided it with military, technological, and financial support over the years. But Hamas is neither a Shiite organization nor an Iranian proxy in the strict sense. It is a Palestinian Sunni movement that has developed a strategic relationship with Tehran, based primarily on their shared hostility toward Israel and on broader regional interests.
Therefore, if Hamas voluntarily disarms or is forcibly disarmed by Israel, the central question will not simply be who takes possession of its weapons. It will also be who governs Gaza, who replaces Hamas, and what guarantees the organization will receive to ensure that surrendering its military power does not lead to its political or physical destruction.
Hezbollah – From Resistance Movement to a State Within a State
Hezbollah differs from Hamas from the very outset. It was established in Lebanon in the early 1980s, against the backdrop of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, with direct assistance from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Since its establishment, Hezbollah has maintained a dual identity. It portrays itself as a Lebanese resistance organization against Israel, while at the same time maintaining deep ideological, military, economic, and political ties with Iran.
This is the fundamental difference between Hezbollah and Hamas. Hamas is first and foremost a Palestinian movement that relies on a strategic relationship with Iran. Hezbollah, by contrast, is more deeply embedded in the Iranian regional system and in the “Axis of Resistance” led by Tehran.
But Hezbollah has also undergone a transformation. It is no longer merely a guerrilla organization. It has become a political party, a significant military force, and a central player in Lebanon’s political system. For years, it effectively maintained the status of a military force that was not fully subordinate to the state, despite its participation in Lebanon’s political institutions, government, and parliament.
Consequently, the demand that Hezbollah disarm is not simply a matter of dismantling a militia. It requires a fundamental change in the balance of power within Lebanon and in the relationship between the state and the organization.
The Militias in Iraq – A Force Born After the Fall of the Regime
The Iraqi case differs from the other two. The main Shiite militias did not emerge from a struggle against Israeli occupation. Rather, they developed following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Iran took advantage of the new reality to strengthen Shiite parties and organizations aligned with Tehran. Some of the militias subsequently became part of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, known as the Hashd al-Shaabi, while maintaining close ties with Tehran and independent military capabilities.
They did participate in the war against ISIS beginning in 2014, but that struggle unfolded alongside the American and international campaign against the organization. It is therefore difficult to portray the militias as the sole or even the primary force responsible for defending Iraq against ISIS.
Unlike Hamas, which exercised de facto control over Gaza for many years, and unlike Hezbollah, which is a major actor within Lebanon’s political system, the Iraqi militias operate within an existing state that has its own government, army, and security institutions.
This makes the question in Iraq seemingly simpler: Why does the state need armed militias operating alongside its own military when there is no longer an enemy that justifies their existence as independent military forces?
A comparison of the three cases shows that their relationship with Iran is not the same.
Hamas is an ideologically and organizationally independent Palestinian movement that received Iranian assistance and support and deepened its ties with Tehran because of its struggle against Israel.
Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization that emerged under the influence of the Iranian Revolution and with Iranian assistance, and over the years became one of Iran’s most important assets in the regional arena.
The Iraqi militias, for the most part, are products of the political reality that emerged following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Some of them subsequently became a central instrument through which Iran projects influence over Iraq’s security and politics.
These differences are particularly important when the question of disarmament arises.
In Gaza, disarming Hamas is part of a much broader question: Who will govern the Strip after the war, given that there is no sovereign state there that can simply take possession of the weapons?
In Lebanon, disarming Hezbollah is a far deeper political question: Will the Lebanese state hold an exclusive monopoly over military force?
In Iraq, the issue is primarily whether the state is willing and capable of enforcing its monopoly over weapons against organizations, some of which maintain direct ties with Iran.
The differences also shape the process itself. Hamas is being asked to surrender the power through which it has governed Gaza. Hezbollah is being asked to give up a force that has made it a central player in Lebanon. And the Iraqi militias are being asked to explain why they require independent military capabilities when an Iraqi state already exists, with its own army and security services.
The Test: Can the Organization Survive Without Its Weapons?
Ultimately, this is the common question confronting all three cases.
Weapons are not merely weapons. They are a source of political, military, and sometimes social power. That is why each of these organizations fears that surrendering them will lead to the loss of its status.
For Hamas, it means losing control over Gaza. For Hezbollah, it means losing its position as Lebanon’s most powerful military force. And for the Iraqi militias, it means losing the leverage that enables them to influence state policy and Iraq’s relationship with Iran.
This is why, according to security officials, disarming the three organizations cannot be merely a military operation. It requires a political arrangement that provides the organizations, and the communities they represent,with an answer to the question of what will replace the power provided by their weapons.
The Israeli Assessment – The Prospect of Success Exists, but the Road Is Long
Israeli political officials say that there is skepticism within the Israeli security establishment regarding the ability to rapidly complete the American initiative and fully disarm all three organizations.
At the same time, the American objective does not necessarily have to be complete and immediate disarmament. The practical goal may instead be to gradually weaken the organizations, reduce their capabilities, and transfer security responsibilities to state institutions or alternative authorities.
In Gaza, the greatest challenge is Hamas. The organization may agree in principle to changes in its status, but the complete dismantling of its military wing would mean surrendering the primary source of power through which it governed the Strip for years.
Moreover, Gaza has no sovereign state with an army that can simply take possession of Hamas’s weapons. This means that an alternative governing and security system would have to be established,or Israel would have to occupy the entire Strip and administer it through an Israeli military government.
In Lebanon, the challenge is different. Hezbollah has been weakened, but it still possesses military capabilities and a significant political and social base.
An attempt to dismantle Hezbollah by force could trigger a severe internal confrontation. It is therefore more likely that, if the process succeeds, it will be gradual and based on a combination of pressure, guarantees, and political arrangements.
In Iraq, there is seemingly a more straightforward possibility of integrating the militias into the state. However, as long as Iran views some of them as strategic instruments for preserving its influence in Iraq and across the region, it is difficult to assume that Tehran will voluntarily relinquish this capability.
This, according to security officials, explains the reasonable Israeli assessment that the American initiative could succeed in weakening the three organizations, restricting their freedom of action, and transferring some of their military capabilities to the state or to an alternative authority.
But the chances of rapidly and completely disarming all three are considerably lower.
According to security officials, American success depends on three conditions: sustained American pressure, Israel’s willingness to provide the political concessions or arrangements required, and,most importantly,the ability of Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian political system to offer a governing and security alternative that would enable the organizations to surrender their weapons without feeling that they are surrendering their very existence.
The realistic American objective, therefore, may not be “disarmament” in the absolute sense, but rather a gradual transformation of the balance of power: fewer weapons outside state or alternative governing frameworks, less military independence for armed organizations, and greater control by official or alternative institutions.
If Washington attempts to achieve everything at once, security officials estimate, the likelihood of failure will increase. But if it proceeds gradually, through incentives, guarantees, pressure, and the creation of political alternatives, the chances of partial, and perhaps eventually substantial, success will be significantly greater.
And this may be the most important point of all: the American struggle is not really only about weapons. It is a struggle over who will be the ultimate security authority in these three arenas,the state, alternative governing institutions, or armed organizations that for years have operated alongside, and sometimes above, the state.
In Gaza, this means creating a reality in which Hamas is no longer the dominant military and political force. In Lebanon, it means restoring the state’s monopoly over the use of force. In Iraq, it means reducing the ability of the militias to function as a state within a state or as instruments of Iranian policy.
In other words, to disarm an organization, it is not enough to take away its weapons. The reality that turned those weapons into a source of power must also be changed.
