Hamas seeks to undermine the IDF’s self-security in preparation for the ground invasion by employing psychological warfare.
Through its media outlets and social networks, Hamas alleges that it secured the IDF’s operational plans during the October 7 attack on the Gaza Strip and that it has prepared accordingly.
The IDF has not officially responded to Hamas’ psychological warfare.
However, sources familiar with the matter suggest that Hamas might face an unexpected turn of events.
Officials within Hamas’s military wing assert that they have obtained a “significant secret security cache” that will take months to decipher and could be highly embarrassing for Israel.
This material was reportedly extracted from the headquarters of the IDF division occupied by Hamas and from the Erez crossing area.
It was stored in computers and security boxes, and Hamas claims it was swiftly transported to the Gaza Strip and handed to Muhammad Def, the supreme commander of Hamas’s military wing.
According to Hamas, this cache includes maps of Hamas tunnels in the Gaza Strip, a list of high-value military targets, key military positions, the names of Hamas military leaders, and the identities of Shin Bet and Civil Administration agents operating within the Gaza Strip.
Hamas contends that it has initiated field operations to identify Israeli agents in the Strip before the impending ground invasion, with the aim of minimizing potential harm.
The military wing of Hamas has already begun interrogating Israeli captives taken to the Gaza Strip, focusing particularly on officers and soldiers, to gauge Israel’s intentions for the ground attack. Hamas claims to have captured several high-ranking officers.
The Israeli security establishment is currently assessing the potential damage resulting from the loss of sensitive materials to Hamas and the capture of officers and soldiers.
Necessary adjustments will be made within a short time frame.
While it remains uncertain whether Hamas can effectively utilize the intelligence it claims to possess, especially given the imminent IDF invasion, it’s reasonable to assume that if it does indeed have sensitive Israeli security information, it might attempt to release it in the media to embarrass Israel and lower morale.
Israel, in response, may need to unveil captured Hamas militants in the media to reveal sensitive information about the Hamas military wing they provided during their interrogations in Israel.
Following the conflict, Israel’s intelligence system will likely undergo significant changes in the classification of intelligence materials accessible to IDF personnel stationed along the borders of Israel, including those with the Gaza Strip, Syria, and Lebanon.
