Senior Israeli political officials assess that Iran is interested in the Memorandum of Understanding aimed at ending the war primarily because of the severe military and economic difficulties it has faced since the conflict began.
According to these assessments, the agreement provides Tehran with much-needed political and economic breathing space, enabling it to weather the remainder of President Donald Trump’s term while preserving its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, assets that it could later rebuild and further develop at a time of its own choosing.
The Iranian leadership requires more than mere regime survival. It needs an agreement that can provide security and stability, facilitate sanctions relief, and unlock access to billions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets abroad.
Such measures are viewed as essential for addressing a growing array of domestic challenges, including the rising cost of living, deteriorating public services, high inflation, unemployment, and the collapse of the national currency.
Senior security officials believe that Iran is unlikely to sign a new nuclear agreement under the terms sought by Washington.
Instead, Tehran is expected to employ delaying tactics and negotiation strategies designed to prolong the talks, operating on the assumption that the longer the process drags on, the more difficult it will become for President Trump to resume military action against Iran.
Iranian officials are well aware that negotiations over the original nuclear agreement with the Obama administration lasted approximately eighteen months.
Consequently, they see little chance that negotiations with the Trump administration can realistically be concluded within the proposed sixty-day timeframe.
In the meantime, Iran is expected to maximize every political and economic advantage that can be derived from the Memorandum of Understanding.
According to senior security sources, Iranian decision-makers believe that the two principal pressure points at their disposal, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, provide them with significant leverage over both the United States and the global economy.
This leverage, they believe, enables Tehran to engage in prolonged negotiations while reducing the likelihood of a return to hostilities. Iran appears prepared to absorb potential pressure from the Trump administration over the next two years, until the end of the president’s term, in order to gain valuable time.
Iranian leaders also recognize the political pressures facing the Trump administration. These include rising fuel prices, the approaching midterm elections in November, and growing pressure from Gulf states seeking regional stability and urging Washington to avoid renewed military escalation.
At the same time, Iran is seeking to protect its regional proxies while promoting its broader security vision among Gulf states, a vision that calls for the removal of foreign military bases from the region.
Although Iran and its allied organizations within the so-called “Axis of Resistance” have suffered substantial setbacks during the war, Tehran still maintains influence through proxy forces in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip, even if these organizations have been significantly weakened.
Senior security officials nevertheless believe that Iran retains the ability to threaten Israel through these proxies. Hezbollah in Lebanon remains Tehran’s most significant regional asset, while the Houthis in Yemen continue to serve as an important deterrent against the United States through their ability to threaten shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and disrupt freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
The American maritime blockade and economic sanctions have had a significant impact on Iran’s economy and financial resources, directly affecting Tehran’s ability to fund these proxy organizations.
This explains Iran’s insistence on receiving an immediate release of approximately $24 billion under the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding. Tehran also expects to generate substantial new revenues once it resumes full oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz following the lifting of the U.S. naval restrictions.
Iran suffered a major strategic setback in Syria with the loss of its ally, President Bashar al-Assad. As a result, it also lost its primary logistical corridor for transferring weapons and military equipment from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon through Syrian territory.
Regarding Lebanon, Iran is increasingly concerned that Israel may seek to dismantle Hezbollah’s second defensive line, particularly the Badr Force positions in the Nabatieh region north of the Litani River, which serve as a protective buffer for Beirut. According to security assessments, this concern was one of the principal reasons behind Iran’s direct intervention in support of Hezbollah and its declaration of a new deterrence formula against Israel, namely that any attack on Beirut’s Dahiyeh district would trigger a direct Iranian response.
Iranian leaders reportedly fear that Hezbollah’s main stronghold in Beirut’s southern suburb is under serious threat and that a large-scale Israeli offensive there could potentially lead to the collapse of Tehran’s most important regional proxy.
Senior security officials believe that Iran is now attempting to “cut its losses.” Publicly, Tehran continues to project confidence and defiance, seeking to maintain the image of a powerful regional actor unwilling to compromise. Behind the scenes, however, it is striving to avoid a full-scale military confrontation with either Israel or the United States in order to prevent further damage beyond the losses it has already sustained.
Iran’s objective is to reach a political accommodation with Washington, but on terms acceptable to Tehran rather than those dictated by the United States. Such an arrangement would safeguard the survival of the Islamic Republic, slow the erosion of Iran’s regional influence, and preserve the foundational principle of Velayat-e Faqih, the rule of the Islamic jurist.
According to senior security officials, Iran is currently experiencing its deepest period of vulnerability since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In this context, Tehran views the Memorandum of Understanding as a potential lifeline, a mechanism through which it can emerge from its current crisis, gain valuable time for economic and military recovery, and gradually dilute American demands regarding its nuclear program through a prolonged and carefully managed negotiation process.
