The war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, which has now entered a temporary pause ahead of fragile negotiations, raises a central question: how is it that a military confrontation with one of the world’s strongest powers has not ended in a clear American strategic victory over Iran.
Senior security officials say that the United States employed extraordinary military force, including intensive airstrikes and the use of advanced naval capabilities. However, the two main objectives defined at the outset of the campaign, opening the Strait of Hormuz and the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, have not yet been achieved.
According to these senior officials, there are several explanations for the survival of the Iranian regime.
First, the limits of conventional military power. Air and naval superiority no longer guarantee decisive victory when the opposing side operates through asymmetric warfare.
Iran did not attempt to confront the United States directly. Instead, it adopted a strategy of attrition and restriction of the adversary’s operational freedom.
The central tool in this strategy was its ballistic missile and drone arsenal.
These relatively low-cost and difficult-to-intercept systems have changed the rules of the game.
They forced the US Navy to maintain distance from Iranian shores to avoid missile range, and made any approach toward Iranian territory a significant risk.
In doing so, Iran effectively neutralized part of its opponents’ qualitative advantage.
The maritime domain clearly illustrated this shift.
The US Navy failed to impose full control over the Strait of Hormuz and avoided deep offensive operations. Rather than serving as a decisive force, it became primarily a supporting instrument. This represents a conceptual shift, as naval dominance has long been considered a cornerstone of American deterrence.
Second, while the United States reportedly destroyed Iran’s formal navy, for reasons that remain unclear it did not target the small fast boats operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These vessels are used to enforce Iran’s de facto ability to threaten or close the Strait of Hormuz.
Third, Iran’s ability to maintain internal cohesion. Contrary to certain expectations, the military campaign did not lead to internal collapse or widespread uprising.
Parts of the opposition, including the reformist camp, adopted a defensive national stance, recognizing that regime collapse could lead to state fragmentation. This removed one of Washington’s key assumptions for rapid regime pressure.
Large-scale protests that erupted last January, involving tens of thousands of demonstrators, subsided after approximately 35,000 were reportedly killed by the Basij.
The population was both intimidated by the regime and still awaiting signals from President Trump, who had previously promised to indicate when renewed protests should begin.
Security sources say the regime’s response to that wave of protests served as a template during the war, systematically preventing any renewed domestic unrest. A combination of tight security control, internal deterrence, and willingness to use extreme force ensured that Iran’s rear remained stable throughout the conflict.
Fourth, Iran has preserved strategic flexibility. It has not conceded on core issues, neither its nuclear program nor its ballistic missile capabilities, and has continued a policy of ambiguity and pressure.
Its control over the Strait of Hormuz has become a central tool for exerting economic and security pressure not only on the United States but on the global economy as a whole.
The lack of decisive outcome is also linked to political constraints. As the campaign prolonged, domestic pressure within the United States on President Trump increased, making further escalation more difficult. In such circumstances, even clear military superiority does not necessarily translate into strategic success.
Finally, the broader transformation of modern warfare must be considered. Contemporary conflicts are increasingly conducted from a distance, through missiles, drones, and unmanned systems. In this environment, even non-superpower states can generate effective deterrence and prevent rapid defeat.
Fifth, the absence of a large-scale ground operation inside Iran that could directly threaten the regime is also a key factor. It is extremely difficult to topple a determined authoritarian regime relying solely on aerial bombardment.
The conclusion emerging from the war is clear: Iran was not defeated militarily not because it won, but because it successfully adapted to the new rules of warfare. It combined relatively inexpensive capabilities, strategic thinking, operational flexibility, and strict internal control, thereby preventing its adversaries from achieving their objectives.
The remaining question is what the next phase will look like. For now, the Iranian regime has achieved one clear outcome: survival.
Will the economy ultimately become the weapon that brings Iran to its knees? Will the naval blockade imposed by Trump eventually force its capitulation? Or will a combination of blockade and large-scale strikes on national infrastructure be required? The answer remains to be seen.
