
Fatah Conference Pushes Gaza to the Margins
Fatah’s eighth conference exposed the depth of the movement’s internal divisions and its growing detachment from the Palestinian public in the Gaza Strip.

Fatah’s eighth conference exposed the depth of the movement’s internal divisions and its growing detachment from the Palestinian public in the Gaza Strip.

The results of Fatah’s 8th General Conference have intensified the succession struggle expected to erupt once PA President Mahmoud Abbas leaves the political stage, while

The killing of the head of Hamas’s military wing in Gaza is viewed in Israel as a significant intelligence and operational achievement. However, assessments indicate that Hamas will continue to reject disarmament demands and will move quickly to appoint a successor in order to project continuity and sustain the struggle against Israel.

The selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader has been accompanied by a significant curtailment of his authority, reducing his role primarily to endorsing decisions rather than making them.

Despite American military superiority, a combination of asymmetric strategy, internal cohesion, and control over the Strait of Hormuz has prevented a swift military defeat of Iran.

Senior security officials assess that the Houthis in Yemen are likely to expand the theater of conflict by targeting maritime traffic in the Red Sea and attempting to disrupt navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait in support of Iran.
Iran, for its part, appears to be pursuing a “pincer strategy” involving both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb, aiming to intensify pressure on the global economy in an effort to halt the war.

The cognitive domain has become one of the central battlefields in the regional confrontation. The elimination of key figures in the propaganda apparatus of Iran and its proxies has created a communications vacuum, undermined their ability to shape coherent narratives, and weakened the Axis of Resistance’s influence over public opinion and the broader regional system.

Who will lead Iran the day after? The assassination of Ali Larijani has shaken the centers of power at the top of the Iranian regime and placed Mojtaba Khamenei before a critical test of survival, while the status of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders continues to strengthen.

Senior Israeli officials assess that a series of strategic failures by the clerical regime, across the fields of nuclear development, regional alliances, and deterrence, have weakened Iran and left it more vulnerable than ever in the current confrontation.

U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessments indicate that, at this stage, the Houthis in Yemen are providing only indirect support to Iran. However, as the situation of the Iranian regime deteriorates, the likelihood increases that they may eventually join the conflict and launch attacks against American and Israeli targets.

Fatah’s eighth conference exposed the depth of the movement’s internal divisions and its growing detachment from the Palestinian public in the Gaza Strip.

The results of Fatah’s 8th General Conference have intensified the succession struggle expected to erupt once PA President Mahmoud Abbas leaves the political stage, while

The killing of the head of Hamas’s military wing in Gaza is viewed in Israel as a significant intelligence and operational achievement. However, assessments indicate that Hamas will continue to reject disarmament demands and will move quickly to appoint a successor in order to project continuity and sustain the struggle against Israel.

The selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader has been accompanied by a significant curtailment of his authority, reducing his role primarily to endorsing decisions rather than making them.

Despite American military superiority, a combination of asymmetric strategy, internal cohesion, and control over the Strait of Hormuz has prevented a swift military defeat of Iran.

Senior security officials assess that the Houthis in Yemen are likely to expand the theater of conflict by targeting maritime traffic in the Red Sea and attempting to disrupt navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait in support of Iran.
Iran, for its part, appears to be pursuing a “pincer strategy” involving both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb, aiming to intensify pressure on the global economy in an effort to halt the war.

The cognitive domain has become one of the central battlefields in the regional confrontation. The elimination of key figures in the propaganda apparatus of Iran and its proxies has created a communications vacuum, undermined their ability to shape coherent narratives, and weakened the Axis of Resistance’s influence over public opinion and the broader regional system.

Who will lead Iran the day after? The assassination of Ali Larijani has shaken the centers of power at the top of the Iranian regime and placed Mojtaba Khamenei before a critical test of survival, while the status of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders continues to strengthen.

Senior Israeli officials assess that a series of strategic failures by the clerical regime, across the fields of nuclear development, regional alliances, and deterrence, have weakened Iran and left it more vulnerable than ever in the current confrontation.

U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessments indicate that, at this stage, the Houthis in Yemen are providing only indirect support to Iran. However, as the situation of the Iranian regime deteriorates, the likelihood increases that they may eventually join the conflict and launch attacks against American and Israeli targets.